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Abstract
This paper examines the response of NGOs to natural disasters, specifically in regards to
collaboration efforts. The study utilizes a comparative case study methodology of most-similar
design to look at three specific disasters- The Kashmir Earthquake, The Sichuan Earthquake, and
The Japan Earthquake. Within each of these earthquakes the organizations Doctors Without
Borders, the International Red Cross, and Oxfam International’s specific responses will be
highlighted. The collaboration efforts will be examined utilizing general questions focusing on
willingness to collaborate, commitment, and compatibility of objectives. Ultimately, this study
found that all three components seem to be hypotheses worthy of further study.
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Introduction
Natural disasters are an inevitable problem across the globe that have affected millions
throughout time and will continue to kill individuals, leave many homeless, disrupt economies,
and cause instability to nations. Due to the serious risks disasters pose to society, the response
efforts and prevention strategies employed throughout the international community need to
continually adapt and improve. The international community responding to these disasters
includes UN agencies, developed nations, and nongovernment organizations (NGOs). NGOs in
particular have an important role to play in response efforts as they operate in unique ways, and
are responsible to a different set of stakeholders than governments and UN agencies.
NGO actions can often be uncoordinated, and not scrutinized as closely as government
practices are. This is why it is important to ensure that these organizations are being held
accountable to those they are attempting to help, and utilizing the most effective forms of
intervention. This study seeks to examine the way NGOs respond to disasters, and how they
interact with other responders. It will specifically focusing on collaboration efforts, as they have
frequently been mentioned in the literature as an area that NGOs have not adequately addressed.
This study will use a comparative case study approach of most-similar design, to look at
three specific disasters. The disasters are all large earthquakes that took place in Asia since 2000The Kashmir Earthquake, The Sichuan Earthquake, and The Japan Earthquake. Within these
earthquakes three NGOs have been chosen to review their reports to look for specific evidence of
collaboration. These organizations are all large, reputable NGOs known for their disaster
response efforts, and who all participated in providing aid following these disasters and shared
some report on their efforts.
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Collaboration will be examined using three general questions applied to all the
organizations and disasters, in hopes to generate hypotheses to be further explored in future
research. The focuses of these general questions are willingness to collaborate, commitment or
trust between responding groups, and compatibility in objectives or services of the organization.
Each of these have been suggested in the literature as either preconditions for collaboration, or
components that contribute to collaboration success.
Ultimately, this study found that all three components seem to be hypotheses worthy of
further study. Willingness to collaborate seems to be a precondition for any collaboration to take
place, as previously suggested in past studies. Both trust and compatibility seem to have roles in
the process as well, though their relationships are less straightforward. These three general
questions should be further explored with a larger sample to determine empirical data regarding
their correlation with collaboration.
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Literature Review
Collaboration is essential when seeking solutions to complex problems. This is the case
for natural disasters, where the effects are so vast that no one entity or organization is able to
solve every problem and assist every person in need of help. Collaboration, cooperation,
communication, and coordination are all words that tend to get used interchangeably when
referring to two or more groups working together. However, collaboration stands apart from the
others as it is not simply about working together, but rather creating something new and better
because of that shared work (Denise, 1999). Collaboration contains elements of cooperation,
communication and coordination in order to be achieved, but collaboration is what is truly
integral to successful disaster relief.
For the purposes of this study collaboration can be defined as “the process of shared
creation: two or more individuals with complementary skills interacting to create a shared
understanding that none had previously possessed or could have come to on their own” (Schrage,
1990, p. 140). Though this term is frequently used in a variety of settings it holds significant
importance to the implementation of real and meaningful solutions to the problems created by
natural disasters and their devastating effects on humanity around the world. We will return to
the topic of collaboration and coordination after discussing disaster response, the role of
international politics, NGOs, and organizational learning.
Responding to Disaster
Natural disasters are unavoidable and horrendous events in numerous ways including loss
of life, hindering country’s ability to function, and high costs of rebuilding and providing relief
after they occur. As Comfort, Ko and Zagorecki highlight in their 2004 study, not only do
disasters create physical problems (such as injuries and infrastructure damage), but they also
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damage “sociocultural infrastructure,” meaning economic, social, and organizational components
of communities. This makes disasters a multifaceted problem for nations to prepare for, deal
with, and overcome afterwards. Sadly, according to studies it seems that natural disasters are not
only here to stay, but are actually getting worse (Von Medling, Oyedele, Cleland, Spillane &
Konanahalli, 2011; Mannakkara & Wilkinson, 2013). These studies point out that climate change
appears to be making storms and disasters both more frequent and intense than before. This
demonstrates how vital it is for organizations, nations, and governments to have adequate
responses to these disasters.
There are four phases of the disaster cycle that have been identified - mitigation and
preparedness (which occur beforehand), response (during and after), and recovery (short and
long-term actions following the disaster) (Von Medling et al., 2011). While mitigation and
preparedness is vital to a community’s outcome following a natural disaster, there is ultimately
no way to stop these disasters, only minimize the damage they have done and help as much as
possible in the aftermath. All phases are important to the process, but this study will focus
primarily on the response and recovery phases. According to Comfort, Ko and Zagorecki’s study
in 2004, the initial stages of response involve protecting lives and helping the injured, while the
recovery periods focuses on long-term effects, such as unemployment, infrastructure, medical
care and housing. This study also emphasized that proper response upfront can significantly
lessen the needs during recovery in the long-term.
Disaster relief includes a variety of activities to help assist communities that have been
affected by natural disasters. Tierney, Lindell, and Perry defined disaster relief as activities that
“reduce physical, social, and economic vulnerability and to facilitate the effective provision of
short-term emergency assistance and longer-term recovery aid" (2001, p. 256). Generally this
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equates to improving life and can include actions such as rebuilding, mitigation efforts, repairs,
regulations and other activities that aim to better the current state of things and improve (Von
Meding et al., 2011).
There are various methods for disaster relief, and many have different ideas as to what is
the best way to really help. The “Build Back Better” strategy proposed by Bill Clinton following
the tsunami in East Asia offers a holistic approach to recovery that tries not only to restore
communities but improve them and make them more resilient (Mannakkara & Wilkinson, 2013).
Other studies have emphasized the need for information to determine “demand flow,” using
estimates of magnitude and effect to figure out how much help and supplies are needed (Comfort
et al., 2004). These sorts of strategies rely on multiple partners effectively working together to
share information, or create a fully holistic approach to relief. There has not been a consensus on
the most effective strategy for response and recovery, but almost all strategies incorporate
collaboration as a necessity to success.
Natural disasters are often too vast and harmful for one entity to fix everything on their
own, which is why collaboration becomes so necessary in assisting in these dire and crucial
moments. According to Hutchinton’s study, earthquakes specifically, which will be the primary
focus on this study, provoke two responses from the international community: either they are
overwhelmed by the devastation and believe the high price of repair and aid make intervention
impossible, or they see international organization as the only way to help (2000). Walking away
from those in need would be a mistake by the international community, so the only way to
overcome these devastating tragedies is to join together. “Large and seemingly unsolvable
problems are best approached from a cooperative angle, combing resources and preventing
duplication” (Kapucu, 2008, p. 256). Kapucu highlights here that there is no better way to
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overcome a daunting task, such as disaster relief, than systematically working to share resources
and delegate tasks.
The Politics of Disaster
The idea of an international organization to coordinate disaster relief was first brought to
the table following World War I (Hutchinson, 2000). This first attempt was the International
Relief Union (IRU). This organization failed due to political constraints, weak funding, and
difficulty in properly administering the organization. There have been attempts since, but still no
international consensus on how to best coordinate, or collaborate, in order to increase the
effectiveness of disaster relief. Most currently the UN has created the Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (Arlikatti, Bezboruah & Long, 2012). This office is ideally
supposed to help coordinate the efforts of different agencies around the globe; the ultimate goal
being to increase cohesion and effectiveness. Clearly collaboration is seen on the international
stage as a necessity to improving response to natural disasters.
One of OCHA’s main approaches is the implementation of “cluster coordination,” which
divides humanitarian organizations (both NGOs and others) that work in areas such as “shelter”
or “health” (“Cluster Coordination,” 2016). By bringing together these groups into clusters the
hope is the organizations will communicate more about the issues that they specifically are
working to fix. However, there does seem to be some problems in this approach so far. This
system came into affect before the infamous response to the Haiti earthquake disaster, which
began public discussions on NGO response effectiveness. This clearly demonstrates that there
are many issues left unresolved. Specifically, these problems include the lack of mechanisms for
accountability, an ineffective hierarchical structure, and low inclusivity of local people and
organizations, among others (Heath, 2014).
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One of the problems of the politics of disasters occurring on the international level is
what Barnett and Walker refer to as the “Humanitarian Club” (2015). This club is “an organized
and hierarchical network of states, donors, international organizations, and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) that centers on the UN system” (Barnett & Walker, 2015, p. 131). These
organizations are driven to retain their own power and control over the disaster relief process,
and therefore avoid change that would move power to aid beneficiaries, i.e. local actors that may
want to be involved in the process. This is a serious barrier to effective collaboration, since these
powerful actors are not willing to share decision-making power and resources and often sideline
local agencies that want to be involved. There is the possibility of positive changes coming in the
future as these actors are organizing a World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 to address this
problem, among others.(Barnett & Walker, 2015). Additionally, Southeast Asian nations have
taken it upon themselves to coordinate outside of “the club” through the creation of ASEAN, and
using their organization to train workers and share information (Barnett & Walker, 2015). Both
the upcoming World Humanitarian Summit and the creation of ASEAN demonstrate that there is
hope for collaboration despite political complications.
Nongovernmental Organizations and Disasters
NGOs have become a large component of the response and recovery process for natural
disasters. Studies have found that NGOs have the potential to not only help during disaster
response, but can do an effective job in the mitigation, preparedness, and recovery phases as well
(Arlikatti, Bezboruah & Long, 2012; Ismail, Majid, Toosli & Samah, 2014). NGOs are becoming
very powerful in their ability to help with development, stepping in where government has failed,
and working in many nations around the world spreading influence (Jarvik, 2007). NGOs operate
differently than other international government organizations do. As Amagoh outlines they have

11

5 specific attributes: they are separate from state organizations, they cooperate with and are
sometimes funded by state organizations but actions are outside of government influence, NGOs
are typically not for profit, they are often voluntary in membership and activities, and they
operate based on ideals (2015). This gives them a very different approach to dealing with disaster
relief, and changes how they operate in these situations. NGOs face different barriers, have
different assets, and varying capabilities.
The common explanation for why NGOs have gotten involved in disaster relief is one of
“government-failure,” or that there was a hole that governments were not filling that NGOs
moved in to assist with (Weisbrod, 1975; Hansmann, 1987; Arlikatti, Bezboruah & Long, 2012).
By assisting with disaster relief, NGOs are creating their own niche in the process that
governments currently are not, and possibly cannot, fill. Arlikatti, Bezboruah and Long’s study
found that NGOs role differed from governments because they focused on vulnerable and
marginalized populations (2012). This study also highlights the main activities that NGOs are
involved with when it comes to disaster relief, “basic health and social services, humanitarian
relief programs following natural or manmade disasters, and promoting the interests of the poor
through developmental projects and/or advocacy initiatives” (Arlikatti, Bezboruah & Long,
2012, p. 65). A different study takes this prescription a step further, pushing NGOs to not only
develop satisfactory projects, but also transform communities using a multi-faceted approach that
addresses all needs, and is holistic in nature (Von Meding et al., 2011).
There are, however, many that find fault with NGOs’ activities in disaster relief. One of
the most serious allegations raised about NGO aid is that they may do more harm than good and
could actually be hurting reconstruction (Mannakkara & Wilkinson, 2013; Von Medling et al.,
2011). These arguments suggest that NGOs may rush to get involved in disaster relief without
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the capacity or knowledge to actually intervene properly, which can make future reconstruction
more difficult. Another common problem researchers in the area point to is lack of accountability
(Barnett & Walker, 2015; Jarvik, 2007). This is because they are not held in check by elections,
they do not fully operate within the free market, and if their projects in a country fail they will
not have to answer to anyone for their mistakes. So while they may have good intentions that is
not enough, and without being held accountable for their actions they may never learn from their
mistakes or they may make decisions without carefully considering the weight of their choices.
Another problem critics highlight is the western superiority that often colors their decision
making in developing countries, which can lead to a reluctance to create real partnerships with
the local communities that they are working in (Von Medling et al., 2011; Barnett & Walker,
2015). NGOs may ignore input from local governments and people, believing what they think is
best should be implemented, without considering the perspectives of those who may understand
the needs of the community greater than they.
Collaboration between NGOs has been highlighted by many studies as being a key to
more effective intervention following natural disasters (Von Medling et al., 2011; Arlikatti,
Bezboruah & Long, 2012; Lu & Xu, 2015; Ismail et al., 2014). In a 2014 study aiming to outline
critical success factors for post-disaster reconstruction in NGOs good
communication/coordination, significant community participation, and government involvement
were all included as factors (Ismail et al., 2014). All these elements are components of the larger
idea of collaboration, not just between NGOs but between NGOs and other key players, such as
community members and governments. Arlikatti, Bezboruah and Long focus in on the relations
between NGOs and governments, by indicating that the work both do are complimentary of one
another, which would allow them to work well together if they were to coordinate their efforts
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more efficiently (2014). Lu and Xu put it most simply by highlighting that when NGOs use
collective decision making and share their resources they help avoid making the situation even
more confusing and disastrous than it already is (2015).
Organizational Learning
Organizations need to learn in order to improve and stop making past mistakes, and
learning almost always contributes to an organization’s ability to perform better (Whatley, 2013).
This is true of all organizations, including NGOs and is especially true when it comes to
humanitarian interventions where lives are at stake. Not only does learning help improve
organizations, but it has been argued that “learning is the foundation for accountability,
dissemination and influence” (Edwards, 1997, p 235). Further, Edwards’ study points out that
because of the increasing demands from donors to see results, and NGOs facing greater scrutiny
from the public, learning is becoming a necessity. Learning from disasters includes not only
implementing mechanisms to receive feedback during response, but also taking the next step to
examine past responses and grow from them too.
Despite the growing evidence in support of organizational learning in NGOs there still
seems to be evidence that it is not changing quickly. A study by Twigg and Steiner found that
many NGOs had difficulty taking learning from just policy discussions to actually implementing
the change (2002). This points out one of the main issues that continues to arise, learning is not
just about making information available and discussing it but actually taking that information
and putting it into real action. Some of the barriers to organizational learning that have been
suggested include cultural deterrence, highly centralized and hierarchical structures that
discourage innovation, and too much information with nobody processing it (Edwards, 1997)
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Whatley’s study suggests that there are three main components for organizations to
consider when trying to develop a strong capacity for learning- these are commitment from
leaders, culture that encourages learning, and mechanisms that support it (2013). NGOs in
particular may need to learn while they act (“learning-by-doing”), because of the nature of their
actions it may take beginning to act to really understand what works and what does not in order
to begin to learn from it (Edwards, 1997). It is possible that it is difficult for NGOs involved in
disaster relief particularly to learn while they are responding because of the high intensity and
need for immediate actions and reactions. While they do not have the time to learn while in the
midst of responding to a disaster, that means that they should instead be focusing on learning
after so they can apply new knowledge before the next disaster strikes. This is vital for
collaboration efforts, because organizations need to not only begin to implement collaboration
strategies but learn from past efforts to improve it in the future.
Collaboration
Ultimately, what is to be learned from the complicated process of disaster relief is no one
sector can do it all on their own. Collaboration is a necessity and governments and NGOs should
be working together to allow their work to be complimentary and integrated, rather than
disjointed and ad hoc (Arlikatti, Bezboruah & Long, 2012). Collaboration, however, is not
something that can be implemented with ease, which is why it still continues to be a problem
facing NGOs, international agencies, and governments around the world.
A particularly important component of collaboration, which often gets forgotten and
ignored by NGOs, is working with the local people they are providing relief for. As Barnett and
Walker put it, “Relief work remains something done to others, not alongside them” (Barnett &
Walker, 2015, p.132). They argue that there is a disconnect between what those receiving need
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and the aid being given, and they are not using these individuals, despite the beneficial assistance
they could provide. While there are obviously moral implications for not including those most
affected into the process, NGOs are also missing out on opportunities that would improve their
own efforts as well. Individuals and local agencies have a vested interest in helping their
community, and often are knowledgeable in ways that NGOs may not be. Lawther in 2009 found
that when communities were involved and invested the outcomes were more sustainable, their
capacity grew with training, and the economy was stimulated. Additionally, another study found
that on the individual level there was a link between involvement in reconstruction and mental or
emotional recovery of the community, as they felt empowered by their work and control over
their lives (Sullivan, 2003). Of course there are barriers to overcome in order to accomplish this
goal- such as creating trust, NGO and government’s hesitation to give power to low-income
groups, and allowing communities to do more than just labor but also take part in decision
making (Lawther, 2009).
There are additional barriers to collaboration when it comes to negotiations on the global
level, as well as local implementation. Lu and Xu point out a number of problems getting in the
way of collaboration in their study, such as confusion created by varying objectives, competition
for resources, lack of trust between organizations and with the government (2015). There are a
number of other barriers that can get in the way of collaboration once it attempts to be
implemented too, including: lack of commitment to the collaboration, confusion over roles of
actors, temporary nature of partnerships, and lack of management to implement the change to
collaboration (Charles, Lauras & Tomasini, 2010).
However, there is potential to overcome these barriers, and even turn them into potential
enablers of collaboration (such as sharing resources rather than fighting over them). There have
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been a number of studies that have suggested some elements that create an environment
conducive to collaboration. This includes, similar goals of the organizations, how embedded the
collaboration is, willingness to cooperate, trust between those involved, openness of the structure
of the organization, stability of the environment, funding set aside for collaboration efforts, and
presence of a central coordinator (Gulzar & Henry, 2005; Charles, Lauras & Tomasini, 2010;
Ismail et al., 2014). So while collaboration has not yet been fully achieved and there is still a
long way to go there is much hope for NGOs in the future to form promising, beneficial, and
powerful collaborations to improve natural disaster relief efforts.
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Methodology
This study utilizes a comparative case-study method to analyze the effects of
collaboration on NGO responses to natural disasters. Utilizing this method allows for
generalizations to be drawn between the incidents, and allows for testing of effects on a
systematic level (Manheim, Rich, Willnat & Brians, 2007). The comparative method is generally
used to discover relationships, and not necessarily produce measurements or quantitative results
(Lijphart, 1971). This case study in particular is a hypothesis-generating case study, which
attempts to create hypotheses to be later tested with a larger sample of cases and with empirical
methods (Lijphart, 1971). Lijpart’s article also emphasizes that the strength of case studies come
from the ability to deeply analyze a small number of cases, and contribute to the literature
through building on existing theories. This study can be seen as a process to explore relationships
between collaboration and other variables in NGO aid following natural disasters, in hopes to
discover areas for further exploration in future studies.
A “most-similar systems design” method was implemented, meaning that very similar
incidents were chosen with certain elements in common (Manheim et al., 2007). Lijphart’s study
suggested that one way to increase the accuracy of case studies is to choose comparable cases
(1971). This allows researchers to hold some variables constant to reduce the number of
“operative variables” and create a more controlled study (p 687). Another suggestion in the
literature for creating comparable cases is to chose incidents in a similar geographic location, and
with a common history (George & McKeown, 1985).
The criteria for similarity used in this study is time period, geographic location, nature of
the disaster, and scale of impact. The three disasters to be studied are earthquakes that occurred
in Asia since the early 2000s, and were of a large scale. The cases are also spaced throughout
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time in hopes that learning will be able to be observed between disasters. NGOs may learn from
past response efforts and apply new knowledge to the next event. The three disasters are
specifically the Kashmir Earthquake, Sichuan Earthquake, and the Japan Earthquake.
Case studies are focused because the researcher is addressing the aspects of the case that
are relevant to the study, and developing questions to ask of each specific case (George &
McKeown, 1985). These questions are general, relevant to all cases, and reflect the goals of the
research. In order to intensively examine the cases under review this study will look at questions
regarding collaboration and NGOs responding to the disasters. The purpose will be to determine
what factors may contribute to an organization’s likelihood to utilize collaboration in their
response effort. Based on the literature of collaboration between organizations a variety of
factors to create success have been identified. Willingness to want to collaborate, commitment or
trust between groups, and compatibility in goals or services, in particular, seem to be the most
fundamental elements mentioned in a variety of studies (Whetton, 1981; Gulzar & Henry, 2005;
Charles, Lauras & Tomasini, 2010).

Question 1: Are organizations that demonstrate more willingness to collaborate more likely to
participate in collaboration efforts?
The first component, willingness to want to collaborate, can be considered a “precondition” for collaboration (Gulzar & Henry, 2005). Two separate studies have labeled this
factor as a necessity for any collaboration to take place at all (Whetten, 1981; Gulzar & Henry,
2005). All of the organizations need to demonstrate the most fundamental desire to want to
collaborate in order for it to be likely they will successfully collaborate. This will be
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demonstrated through the reports’ mentions of collaboration, and the degree to which it is
emphasized by the NGOs under examination.

Question 2: If more trust or commitment exists between the responding organizations will
collaboration efforts be more frequent?
The next general question to be explored in this study is the existence of trust between the
various partners, and how that affects the collaboration efforts of the NGOs. Both Gulzar and
Henry’s study, as well as Charles, Laurus, Tomasini both cited trust and commitment as
fundamental elements of successful collaborations (2005; 2010). In this study we will not just
look at trust and commitment within the NGO community, but also the host country’s
government. An NGO’s ability to work within a country can be impacted by the trust the country
displays towards them in allowing them to work in the state, as well as work with the state.

Question 3: If organizations have similar objectives and services provided are they more likely
to create collaborations?
The final general question that will be applied to the case studies is the compatibility in
goals, objectives, or services of the organization. This has also been identified as one of the
features of organizations that can help collaboration efforts when goals align (Gulzar & Henry,
2005; Charles, Lauras & Tomasini, 2010). If two actors are attempting to work towards the same
objective or are providing similar services then they have more overlap in their overall goals, and
therefore this can facilitate collaboration much more easily. This is likely the motivation behind
strategies such as the UN Cluster Approach. If NGOs (or governments and other agencies), have
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similar goals during the relief process, then they will be more likely to enter into collaboration
efforts with one another.

The Disasters
The Kashmir Earthquake
On October 8th of 2005, an earthquake hit South Asia. Affecting India, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan- but the most damage was done in Pakistan where the epicenter of the earthquake was
(Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, 2006). According to this same report the magnitude
was measured to be 7.6 on the ten-point Richter Scale. Additionally, it was reported that 75,000
people were killed, 70,000 were injured, and as many as 3.5 million people became homeless or
were at least temporarily displaced. In addition, this source reported that 780,000 buildings were
either damaged or destroyed, as well as many roads, and power and water supplies were affected.
The earthquake also triggered a number of landslides that made reaching individuals during the
response more difficult.
The response efforts were largely viewed as successful, especially given the size and
nature of the disaster, and were largely coordinated by the Pakistan Army (Wilder, 2008). This
created an incredibly interesting dynamic, as many humanitarians were at least initially uneasy
with the idea of working under the direction of a military. Their influence was largely by default,
since they were the most powerful organization in the country, and no real plan for disaster
response had previously existed in Pakistan Wilder, 2008). However, despite initial hesitation to
work with each other, it seems that because of the intensive work through coordinated efforts,
aid workers and military officials formed “mutual respect, and trust” for each other (Wilder,
2008, p 59). Overall, the presence of a strong coordinating force within the country seems to
have had an impact on the effectiveness of the overall response, as well as collaboration efforts.
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The Sichuan Earthquake
The Sichuan Earthquake took place on May 12th in 2008. It is also referred to as the
Wenchuan Earthquake. The earthquake was an 8.0 magnitude earthquake on the Richter Scale
(Agence France-Presse, 2008). This report database indicated that the epicenter of the quake was
the Sichuan province in China, though the damage spread throughout 40,000 miles of the
country. The same source reported nearly 70,000 people were killed, 17,000 more were missing,
and 374,000 were injured, 5 million people were left homeless. Additionally, it estimated that
there was an estimated $29 billion in loses for the country. The infrastructure of the many of the
homes, and public buildings such as schools were mostly made of mud bricks (Daniell, 2013).
Many of the buildings collapsed in the quake due to their poor structure. The devastation from
the earthquake was so vast that it is the first time in recent years that China requested
international assistance for the large-scale recovery efforts, despite their initial resistance
(Daniell, 2013).
Following the disaster Human Rights Watch reported that the country was not adequately
responding to the disaster (Richardson, 2010). This included examples such as pressuring parents
of children killed in the collapse of a school building not to seek civil action, arresting reporters
who attempted to cover the extent of the damage, and other propaganda efforts by the state. The
government of China was very slow to begin trusting help from the outside world (Richardson,
2010; Cochrane, 2008). This likely hindered any collaboration efforts that the organizations may
have attempted, since the government of the country was at first completely unwilling, and then
later still reluctant, to accept help and let outside agencies in.
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The Japan Earthquake
The recent Japan Earthquake hit on March 11th, 2011. The earthquake’s magnitude was
measured as a 9.0 (United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2011). The
strength of which also triggered a devastating tsunami that hit the coast shortly following the
initial earthquake. This OCHA report stated that the earthquake killed 11,600 people, displaced
nearly 500,000, and over 16,000 people were missing. In terms of infrastructure damage,
138,000 buildings were damaged and 17,000 were destroyed. Not only did the earthquake trigger
a tsunami, but also caused the meltdown of a nuclear power plant. This meltdown released
dangerous radioactive materials, and caused further displacement and danger for people in
surrounding areas.
The context of Japan is different than the other countries because of the developed nature
of the county. Organizations often rush to help following a disaster because they occur in
countries where it is clear that the nation alone will not have the capacity to address the many
problems. However, when the earthquake hit in Japan there was a delay before organizations
decided to directly respond (Gannon, 2014). According to one source, the Japanese government
not only welcomed help from the international community, but “appealed to the world for it”
(Choate, 2011). There was mention in reports, however, that there was not a successful attempt
at a national coordinated response from the county, despite their appointment of a member of
parliament to act as a “go-between” for NGO and government activities (Gannon, 2014; Choate,
2011).

NGOs Under Examination
In addition to reviewing three key disasters, three NGOs have been identified that played
a part in all of the disasters. These organizations are the International Federation of the Red
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Cross, Oxfam International, and Médecins Sans Frontières (or Doctors Without Borders). The
first criteria for selection was that the organization played a role in the three disasters selected for
these case studies. The next important feature in looking for the right organizations was that they
had published at least some sort of report or overview of their work in the country following the
disaster. Additionally, these three organizations were listed as the top organizations for
International Emergency Response in a list published by Philanthropedia, a website that rates
verifiable charities working in a variety of areas (Philanthropedia, 2011). By picking three wellranked organizations that all worked in the regions affected by the disasters following the
earthquakes it allows this study to continue to implement a “most-similar” design strategy.
The data collection is largely based on reports released by these organizations. This
enables examination of their involvement, collaboration efforts, and ability to learn from past
responses. However, different agencies structure their reports in various ways and are not
necessarily uniform between disasters. This leads to a limitation in the study, as some
organizations released much more detailed reports and certain disasters seemed to receive a more
comprehensive report for organizations than others. However, this variation in reports could be
indicative of the organizations desire to learn, or a reflection of their developing tactics for
reviewing their efforts. Therefore, the depth of the reports is considered in the analysis of the
data collected from the sources.
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) was
founded in the early 1900s, and has now grown to be the world’s largest humanitarian
organization with nearly 200 member societies (Our vision and mission, 2016). The organization
provides aid in a variety of humanitarian disasters, including natural disasters such as
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earthquakes. They have four central focuses- promoting humanitarian values, disaster response,
disaster preparedness, and health and community care- indicating that they are involved in all
stages of the response process, from initial responses to recovery (Our vision and mission, 2016).
The international organization responds when disasters are past the capacity of local agencies to
act alone, and they continually provide support and resources to their offices around the globe.
More specifically, the organization lays out 4 specific objectives of the organization.
Their goals are to: 1- reduce impact of disasters; 2- reduced impact of health emergencies; 3increase capacity to address vulnerabilities; 4- promote values such as diversity, inclusion, and
tolerance (Our Objectives, 2016). In terms of the specific services the organization provides, it
varies greatly and is dependent on the situation. This includes, procurement and transportation of
supplies, community infrastructure improvement, blood donation, pushing for policy changes
regarding disaster policy, and more (What we do, 2016). When it comes specifically to disaster
response, their activities include food supplies, cash voucher programs, setting up health
facilities, providing clean water, psychological support, and more.
Oxfam International
Oxfam International is composed of nearly 20 other smaller organizations that operate at
national and regional levels across the globe, and has been around since the 1990s (Who we are,
2016). Their main target is to help address poverty, however they also respond to crises to help
rebuild. They specifically focused vulnerable and marginalized populations, to try and empower
them to overcome the challenging circumstances surrounding them. They also place a great
emphasis on collaboration, working with not only their regional affiliates but striving to create
other partnerships when possible to create “global co-operation and cohesion” (Our purpose and
beliefs, 2016).
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Oxfam international has six specific objectives when it comes to their overall aim of
decreasing poverty. These objectives are, improving human rights internationally, improving
gender equality, responding to natural disasters, fighting climate change, securing global food
supply, and helping the poor obtain adequate cash flow (How we fight poverty, 2016). When it
comes to their disaster relief efforts the organization they help in the short-term by assessing
needs, distributing food, constructing sanitation equipment, shipping emergency supplies,
providing shelter kits, . They also emphasize that they stay in the country to help in the long-term
as well, through helping individuals grow and buy food, as well as finding stability again
following the disaster (How we help in times of crisis, 2016).
Doctors Without Borders
Established in France, Doctors Without Borders is also known as Médecins Sans
Frontières (or MSF). When the NGO was first founded in the 1970s it had only 300 staff
members and was limited in how many countries it was able to respond to (Founding of MSF,
2016). Now, the organization responds to disasters all around the world, has offices in over 25
countries, and employs 30,000 people. The organization is able to help millions of people every
single year, and provide quality care at times when it is most crucial.
While MSF is largely focused on the medical care of the individuals affected by disasters
and other humanitarian crises, they also support other objectives. The organization provides
quality medical care, but also bears witness to crisis and tries to bring attention to international
problems, and remains neutral in areas of crisis providing medical attention to whoever requires
it (About MSF, 2016) . MSF has very targeted services that they bring to areas experiencing
disasters- they provide trained, professional doctors to respond in areas of humanitarian crises
(Founding of MSF, 2016).
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An important note about the organization is the limited nature of the reports made
publicly available for the data review. While they do produce annual reports, and detail their
specific efforts in the country they are much more limited in length and depth than the other
organizations. They ultimately seemed to be for the purpose of attracting more donors, rather
than growing from their experience and sharing information about their successes and failures
for other organizations to learn from.
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Evidence of Collaboration
Kashmir
At the time the Kashmir earthquake struck the UN was still in the midst of developing
their cluster approach, but decided to implement it anyway in hopes that it would assist in the
response efforts (Cochrane, 2008). An analysis performed by the Humanitarian Policy Group
ultimate found that while it may have helped overall, there were confusions such as, “the unclear
role of the clusters, the confusion between cluster leads and their own agency’s objectives”
(Cochrane, 2008, p 20). A similar report published by the Feinstein International Center found
that there were other problems with collaboration, including too many ineffective cluster
meetings, a “UN centric” feel, leaving out of Islamic groups, and ineffective decision making
(Wilder, 2008). Additionally, there is some evidence that many local agencies, especially small
ones, were being sidelined because of meetings held only in English, too many cluster meetings,
location of meetings, and NGOs paying competitive wages that hurt local staff retention (Wilder,
2008; Cochrane, 2008).
Despite some of this negative press surrounding the NGO response, there were some
elements of cluster system and the general response that were found to be productive. It was
suggested that the cluster meetings “were a useful forum for information sharing and
networking” despite not being great for coordination (Wilder, 2008, p. 23). Additionally,
organizations, including the IFRC, were commended on using the opportunity to improve their
relations with the Islamic nonprofits and groups in the area (Wilder, 2008). As mentioned earlier,
the contributions of the Pakistan Army to coordinating the response effort seem to have made the
entire response very effective given the magnitude of the disaster.
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The reports released from the agencies themselves showed some evidence that they had
made some strides in regards to collaboration. Oxfam and IFRC credited Pakistan agencies,
specifically the Earthquake Recovery and Rehabilitation Authority, as being an organization that
supported their efforts and helped to coordinate them through regular meetings (Oxfam
International, 2006; International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
[IFRC], 2012, Final Report). This reflects the strong presence of the government of Pakistan and
the military in trying to involve themselves in the disaster, as was mentioned in the external
reports (Wilder, 2008). From Oxfam and IFRC’s reports it is clear that they also recognized the
power of having a central coordinator housed in the nation.
In Oxfam International’s report, they also brought into question how much their agency
had utilized local communities’ input into their relief efforts, and even tried to open
conversations with their stakeholders to find out how to better incorporate them in the future
(Oxfam International, 2006). While the Red Cross did not touch on the problem with local
collaboration specifically they did list coordination among their recommendations for the future
in their report stating, they wanted to “Improve coordination between programmes to ensure
monitoring data collecting is shared to avoid duplication, save cost and maximize resources”
(IFRC, 2012, Final Report, p 21). This demonstrates that both Oxfam and IFRC at the very least
saw collaboration as a priority, and recognized their need to further improve it in the future.
Contrastingly, MSF had limited mention of collaboration in their reports of the disaster
(Medicins San Frontiers [MSF], 2006). The organization only made mentions of referrals they
made to regional hospitals. Surprisingly, there was even some evidence of the organization
working against collaboration, by getting their own helicopters for their private use rather than
sharing resources with local agencies and organization. This allowed them the freedom to travel
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to areas they prioritized, but did not allow other organizations the same freedom. However, one
source mentioned that MSF’s desire to ensure independence of their operation was likely
motivated by their objective and emphasis of neutrality. Since the army was leading many of the
missions and largely controlled the response efforts, MSF was wary of aligning too closely with
the group and wanted to be sure their integrity was not called into question (Charles, Lauras &
Tomasini, 2010).
Sichuan
Following the Sichuan Earthquake in China, most of the attention around collaboration
was focused on the Chinese government. While many organizations were trying to send help,
volunteers, and money, the government was reluctant to allow NGOs and outside countries to
help in the response efforts (Richardson, 2010). This makes it somewhat difficult to analyze what
sort of collaboration would have been possible if the country had been more open to international
assistance from the start. However, one head of a health department in China noted that he
received hundreds of calls from various NGOs, when it would have been more streamlined to
just receive one call and have that individual disseminate the information to all others (Lu & Xu,
2015). This demonstrates the mechanisms were not in place for collaboration, but it is unclear
how much the government resistance impeded NGO efforts.
Oxfam in particular seems to have made the most strides to improve their collaboration
efforts in this response. Their report following their response to Sichuan mentioned 20
organizations they worked alongside, including local nonprofits, government agencies and other
NGOs (Oxfam Hong Kong, 2009; Oxfam Hong Kong 2013). Their reports also demonstrated
that not only did they work with these organizations, but also offered training sessions to help
build up their local partners and help them increase their capacity in the future. These
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organizations were all local nonprofits and NGOs in China that shared similar objectives to
Oxfam. Not only was Oxfam International working with local groups but they included local
villagers as well in a method called “participatory work” (Oxfam Hong Kong, 2009; Oxfam
Hong Kong, 2009). Further, they considered this to be a defining characteristic of their program,
and felt it improved upon passed attempts to collaborate.
The IFRC’s report focused primarily on collaboration with the Chinese government,
though not local nonprofits. In their report they identify the Mianzhu Labor Bureau and the
International Labour Organization as being essential for helping those affected (International
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies [IFRC], 2012, Emergency Appeal).
However, they did mention that working with the Chinese government created barriers.
Specifically their report highlights that the IFRC found it difficult to develop programs supported
by the international community that were also accepted in the Chinese context, where the
government had a strong presence in how they wanted things done. This clearly demonstrates the
lack of trust and commitment on the part of the government.
Similar to the Kashmir report, this report from MSF was also very limited in evidence
and mention of collaboration. The only mention of collaboration from MSF in their report was
their work with the local chapter of their organization during their response (Medicins San
Frontiers, 2009). Clearly there is a complete alignment of objectives and strategies between the
international and local chapters, so working together would have been incredibly less difficult
than forging outside collaborations. This does not mean that they did not work with anyone else,
but it does demonstrate that they did not see it as important enough to mention.

31

Japan
The situation in Japan created a very different setting for INGO intervention and local
nonprofit involvement. Since Japan is a more developed nation than either Kashmir or China,
which made many NGOs and other organizations hesitant to rush in at first (Gannon, 2014).
Japan had many individuals and groups set up to help, but INGOs had not worked in the area and
had no ties with them so they ended up sidelining and ignoring them rather than incorporating
them into their response efforts. So while there may have been a willing host government that
trusted these organizations, and wanted to see them help there were still barriers to overcome.
Oxfam International continued to emphasize their efforts to collaborate with others,
taking even further steps than in the past disasters. They placed special emphasis on continuing
to focus on the partnerships with local nonprofits (Oxfam Japan’s response to the Earthquake and
Tsunami, 2013). In the report, they list each partner organizations, which include both
international NGOs and local nonprofits. Again, these organizations all seem to be ones that
match their objectives and strategies closely. MSF also made some mentions of their attempts to
fill in the gaps of emergency response, indicating they were trying to effectively collaborate by
not duplicating services (Medicins San Frontiers, 2011).
The IFRC does not offer any new steps in their collaboration with the response they
provided in Japan, however they continue to stress the importance of collaboration in their report
(Tablott, Staines, & Wada, 2012). The IFRC worked with the local Red Cross, and made
attempts to work with the government despite trouble communicating. It seems that the Japanese
government attempted to help facilitate this collaboration, by implementing a “Japanese
Platform,” a foundation supporting aid and coordination between different organizations and
sectors. The platform served as a point of coordination for the national NGO sector. One area the
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IFRC did make strides in was the meetings they hosted during the recovery stage with 14 other
NGOs to share updates, and communicate the problems they were all facing (Talbott et al.,
2012). Again, these organizations seem to be ones within their objective areas of focus. Finally,
in the recommendations section of their report they included a concern for collaboration, and a
desire to begin building relationships with other agencies and NGOs in countries before disaster
strikes to aid the response and recovery process. This also demonstrates their desire to continue
making strides towards more and better collaboration efforts in the future.
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Discussion
The response efforts of Oxfam International, the IFRC, and MSF to the earthquakes in
Kashmir, Sichuan, and Japan were all varied in their approaches. More importantly, however, the
organizations were all across the board in their efforts to collaborate. In general trend seems to
be that Oxfam International excelled the most at improving their collaboration efforts, especially
when it came to working with local people and nonprofits. IFRC also made great strides in
making collaboration a priority. MSF showed a few instances of collaboration efforts, but they
seemed greatly limited in comparison to the other organizations.
Kashmir
Table 1- Collaboration Results: Kashmir Earthquake
Organization

Willingness to
Collaborate

Trust

Aligned
Objectives and
Strategies

Demonstration of
Collaboration

IFRC

Yes

Yes (both
government and
NGO)

N/A

Limited

Oxfam

Yes

Yes (both
government and
NGO)

N/A

Limited

MSF

No

No (not NGO)

N/A

No

As is seen in Table 1, the organizations had some success with collaboration, but it was
limited following the Kashmir earthquake. While sources stated this was one of the most
effective efforts at responding to a disaster and that collaboration was positively impacted
because of the military’s lead role, it seems that was not entirely true for all the organizations
examined here. The organizations here benefitted from the desire of the Pakistan government to
trust and work with them, though they were not necessarily trusting at first. MSF, however,
never fully trusted the Pakistan government, likely in large part due to their desire to remain
impartial. The organization also never seemed willing to collaborate with any of the
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organization, which clearly made collaboration almost impossible. Both IFRC and Oxfam
demonstrated limited collaboration efforts during this disaster. While they were involved with
the cluster approach, they themselves did specifically seem to seek out organizations that aligned
with their goals and strategies which possibly limited their efforts.
Sichuan
Table 2- Collaboration Results: Sichuan Earthquake
Organization

Willingness to
Collaborate

Trust/Commitme
nt

Aligned
Objectives and
Strategies

Demonstration of
Collaboration

IFRC

Yes

No (not
government)

No

Limited

Oxfam

Yes

No (not
government)

Yes

Yes

MSF

Yes

No (not
government)

Yes

Limited

The summary of the results from the Sichuan earthquake collaboration efforts can be seen
summarized in Table 2. It is clear that there is some progress in the efforts collaboration. Oxfam
was able to create some meaningful collaborations, specifically with organizations that aligned
with their objectives and strategies. IFRC made attempts, but were largely hindered due to the
reluctance of the Chinese government to trust them. MSF did make small strides, mentioning
their collaboration with their own local chapter but had no other instances mentioned or working
with other organizations, or the government.
Interestingly, Oxfam seems to have generated some meaningful collaboration efforts
even without the commitment of the government. This is possibly because of how much of a
priority the organization sees it as, or that the trust of government is not always imperative for
success. Additionally, it could indicate that because they chose to create partnerships with other
NGOs and nonprofit- not the government like IFRC had- they were able to bypass this factor.
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Japan
Table 3- Collaboration Results: Japan Earthquake
Organization

Willingness to
Collaborate

Trust

Aligned
Objectives and
Strategies

Demonstration of
Collaboration

IFRC

Yes

Yes (both
government and
NGO)

Yes

Yes

Oxfam

Yes

Yes (both
government and
NGO)

Yes

Yes

MSF

Yes

Yes (both
government and
NGO)

N/A

Limited

All the organizations continued to improve in their collaboration efforts by the time the
Japan earthquake struck. The organizations all showed a willingness to collaborate, even MSF to
a lesser degree than the others. The Japan government was very willing to accept the aid of the
organizations, and did their best to implement a variety of tools to help facilitate communication
(though some seem to have limited success). This seems to have improved all the organizations’
ability to collaborate.
Additionally, both IFRC and Oxfam showed evidence in their reports that they were able
to work with organizations that aligned with their objectives and strategies. This seems to be a
natural way organizations begin reaching out to others that they find similar to their own. While
MSF did mention working to fill in the gaps of disaster management, they had no mention of
specifically working with organizations that aligned with their objectives or strategies. This
makes it difficult to interpret the nature of extent of the collaboration efforts they participated in.
While not directly related to this research, one interesting observation drawn from the
various reports overtime was the decrease in importance of the cluster approach. The cluster
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approach from the OCHA is one of the strategies utilized in the international response to all three
disasters, and is still a part of the UN’s international approach today (“Cluster Coordination,”
2016). Interestingly, there was little mention of the cluster response in any of the reports,
especially after the Kashmir earthquake- where it was initially debuted. Even though this strategy
is still currently part of the UN strategy, it does not seem to be an important aspect of these
organizations’ response efforts. Their lack of concern about or mention of the cluster approach,
may suggest it is not effective or even something the organizations are actively involving
themselves in.
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Conclusion
Oxfam International specifically seemed to care a great deal about collaboration, and it
was obvious that it became an increasing priority for them throughout their reports.
Collaboration was always mentioned in some form in the reports, whether initially as an aspect
they needed to improve and later as a point of pride (Oxfam International, 2006; Oxfam Hong
Kong, 2013; Oxfam Japan’s response to the Earthquake and Tsunami, 2013). From their first
report following Kashmir to their reflection on Japan, they seem to be more explicitly creating
partnerships with various NGOs and local nonprofits, and even local victims they incorporated
into their processes. While IFRC were not as quick to implement collaboration efforts as Oxfam
International, their final report in Japan clearly demonstrates how they had begun to prioritize
communication and hopefully indicates they will continue to grow in this area in the future. They
began to work with organizations that aligned with their missions and strategies to become even
more effective than previously. Doctors Without Borders made slow and gradual progress in
their move towards collaboration, and while they made no significant or meaningful attempt at
collaboration in these efforts their trend seems to be moving in the right direction.
While this is just a small piece of the NGO network and focuses on just a few specific
disasters, these organizations are some of the front runners when it comes to involvement and
response to natural disasters. The hypotheses generated in this comparative case study, seem to
have promise for further exploration in future empirical studies on NGO collaboration. Some
seem to have a stronger correlation than others with collaboration efforts, but all seem to be
somewhat interrelated.
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Question 1: Are organizations that demonstrate more willingness to collaborate more likely to
participate in efforts?
There was not a single instance of collaboration in these case studies that happened
without the willingness of the organization to want to be involved in collaboration efforts. All the
organizations had to at least mention a conscious effort to want to work with other organizations
or the government in order for this factor to be considered affirmative. This does provide further
evidence to support the theory that this is precondition for collaboration to take place. Not only is
it intuitive that organizations need to be consciously on board with supporting collaboration, but
the data collected here further supports this question.

Question 2: If more trust or commitment exists between the responding organizations will
collaboration efforts be more frequent?
This question seems to have more mixed results than the first. While it does not seem to
be a precondition, like willingness, in that collaboration was still possible without the mutual
trust and commitment of the organizations and the government there still does seem to be
support for its inclusion. In all instances where there was mutual trust between the government
and the NGOs there was some level of collaboration, whether it was meaningful or just limited
efforts. However, in China where there was not trust or commitment from the government all the
organizations had varying degrees of collaboration that they participated in. It seems that while
this may have been a barrier to collaboration, as IFRC seemed to suggest in their report, it was
not impossible to get around. Oxfam in particular did an effective job of working with other nongovernment organizations in the country to avoid this lack of trust problem. Additionally, when
the lack of trust came from the organization, in the case of MSF and Pakistan, there was no trust
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present at all. This could imply that while a government trust is a benefit to collaboration,
organizational trust is more of a necessity. Ultimately, more research would need to be
conducted to understand the cause of this variation.

Question 3: If organizations have similar objectives and services provided are they more likely
to create collaborations?
Organizations that have similar objectives and services seem to be more likely to
collaborate. Like with the trust variable, it does not seem to be a necessity for collaboration.
There were a few instances of collaboration that occurred without the presence of similar
objectives. However, it seems that when organizations did have meaningful collaboration
attempts they were with other organizations that had those similar objectives and services. This
relationship is not straightforward, and would benefit from further research into its intricacies.

There were some limitations with this study. Firstly the study only focused on three
specific cases within a single geographic area, which limits its transferability to other disasters or
organizations. The organizations were also all larger NGOs, which means they may be even less
representative of the smaller actors. The primary limitation in this study is the varying nature of
the reports examined. There is not a standardized reporting method between organizations, or
even within them. This means that the reports from the different organizations look very
different from one another and included a variety of different information. Additionally, even
from one disaster to another the organizations formatted their reports in very different ways as
well. This means that sometimes it was not possible to gather the necessary information, which is
why “N/A” was sometimes seen in Table 1, 2 and 3. It also means that there may have been
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instances of collaboration that happened but were just not mentioned in the report because the
agency did not see it as part of the report’s objectives. This is one of the reasons why more
research should be done to elaborate upon the findings in this study.
While there are limitations in this study, it generates a group of hypotheses that should be
further tested to determine their relation to collaboration efforts. Future studies should firstly
attempt to fill in the gaps where information could not be found just through the method of report
reviewing. For example, discussing alignment of goals with other agencies, or explicitly asking
about agency’s willingness to collaborate. More empirical studies could be used to actually
determine the casualty of these variables in instances of collaboration. Another area for future
study is the use of regional and international reporting on collaboration, to utilize a third-party
view of the efforts. This would help to determine whether or not NGOs are being consistent or
biased in their organizational reports of their efforts following these disasters. Utilizing both
international news reports (such as the Washington Post or BBC) and more local news agencies
it would allow for a fuller picture of collaboration to come together.
Another suggestion for future research is the follow-up to determine if organizations are
actually learning. While it appears here that they seem to be improving over time there is not
clear evidence that organizational learning is necessarily place. Future studies could further
explore this topic of organizational learning as it applies to collaboration, and possibly other
areas of NGO work in natural disasters. Learning is an important part of the response process
because these organizations should ideally be continuing to improve their response efforts
overtime to become more effective and ultimately save more lives.
Willingness to collaborate, trust and commitment, and alignment of goals should all
continue to be explored to expand this area of study. Collaboration continues to be a key point of
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discuss in collaboration efforts, but also seems to be appearing more frequently in organization’s
reports. This gives all the more support to researching the factors that encourage the successful
implementation of collaboration. As NGOs begin to utilize this method more frequently in their
response efforts, they should be aware of the context and conditions of collaboration that give
them the best chance at success.
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